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RECENT CASES
Antitrust LawSECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT APPLIED TO
VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS AND HELD TO ENCOMPASS
ACQUISITIONS WHICH WHEN MADE DID NOT HAVE
THE EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIALLY LESSENING
COMPETITION
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company purchased twenty-three per
cent of the common stock of General Motors Corporation during the period
1917 to 1919.1 At the time of suit General Motors purchased two-thirds
of its paint and two-fifths of its fabric requirements from du Pont.2 The
Justice Department brought suit in equity against du Pont in 1949, alleging, inter alia,5 that the stock acquisition resulted in a violation of section
7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. 4 The district court dismissed the action.
7
On direct appeal'- the Supreme Court reversed in a four-two decision.
Limiting the applicable market to finishes and fabrics for the automobile
industry,8 the Court found that du Pont's twenty-three per cent stock
holding gave it sufficient influence to enable it to compel General Motors
to purchase these products solely from du Pont.9 Although the lower court
1. At that time, du Pont was beginning to diversify from the manufacture of explosives; General Motors was one of the comparatively small automobile manufacturers
competing for the market left by the dominant Ford Motor Company. Brief for Appellees, p. 284, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
2. Instant case at 596. As to the paint sales, this amounted to four-fifths of du
Pont's total sales of the products involved. Instant case at 605.
3. It was alleged that defendant also had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
26 SrAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952). These formed the main
thrust of the government's complaint and briefs in both courts. The district court held
that the Government had failed to prove a conspiracy to restrain trade, 126 F. Supp.
235, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1954), and the Supreme Court rested its decision wholly on the
Clayton Act count.
4. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), (later amended by 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1952)). However, this suit is governed by the section as it existed prior to amendmerit, since the latter applies, by its terms, only to acquisitions subsequent to its enactment. Ibid.
5. 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
6. Direct appeal is permitted under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 STAT. 823
(1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1952).
7. Justices Clark Harlan and Whittaker did not participate in the decision.
8. Instant case at 594.
9. It has been indicated that the control requirement for § 7 is satisfied by the
ability of the acquirer to elect one member of the board of directors of the acquired
corporation. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 315 (D.
Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). In the instant case, five members of the
thirty-man General Motors board were alleged to be du Pont nominees. Brief for
Appellants, p. 156, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957).
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had decided that thirty years of non-exclusive dealing negated any threat
that du Pont would exercise any control it might have,10 the Supreme Court
held that du Pont had achieved its present sales position through this
influence," and that this fact indicated a reasonable probability that
du Pont might exercise its full influence, foreclosing the General Motors
market from its competitors.' 2

United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957).
Section 7 is a preventive measure the purpose of which is to arrest
the creation of monopolies and restraints on competition before they have
been consummated. 13 It prohibits the acquisition by a corporation of ".. .
the whole or any part of the stock . . . of another corporation . . .

where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain . . . commerce in any

section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." '1 A reasonable probability that the acquisition will result in a
lessening of competition to a substantial degree has been held sufficient
to constitute a violation of this section. 1 Until the instant case all reported
adjudications under the section"6 have involved horizontal acquisitions,
i.e., between companies offering competing goods.17 In these cases proof
10. 126 F. Supp. 235, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
11. Instant case at 603.
12. Instant case at 607. The dissent disagreed with the majority on its determination of the relevant market, id. at 648, that du Pont's 23% stock holding was sufficient

to enable du Pont to force General Motors to buy products solely from du Pont, id. at
610, and that a reasonable probability of foreclosure existed, id. at 646.
13. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
14. 38 STA. 731 (1914), (later amended by 64 S,AT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1952)). This section as amended read as follows: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."
Ibid.
15. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1929). Cf. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1921); Transamerica Corp. v.
Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
16. In a private action for treble damages, a district court has applied § 7 to the
acquisition by a rayon converter of a rayon manufacturer. Ronald Fabrics Co. v.
Verney, CCII TRADE REG. REP. (1946-47 Trade Cas.) 1157514 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). In
Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 942 (1953), the court determined that the acquisition by a selling agent of
40% of the stock of a stove manufacturer did not substantially affect competition.
However, Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335
U.S. 303 (1948), argues that the section should apply to Ford's acquisition of stock
in a finance company. Id. at 326.
17. Horizontal acquisitions involve corporations which offer the same or similar
products or services, or products or services which can be substituted for each other.
Vertical acquisitions involve corporations which stand in a supplier-customer relation
to each other. Conglomerate acquisitions include all those which can neither be classified as horizontal or vertical. See Bock, Economic Pattens in Merger Cases, in CoxFEENcE BOARD, EcoNomIc CONCENTRATION MEASURES: USES AND ABUSES 35, 37
(1957).
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of substantial lessening of competition has required a showing that substantial competition had existed between the corporations previous to the
acquisition.' 8 While the share of the relevant market held by the merging
companies has not been determinative of substantiality, 19 in the nationally
advertised watch industry, for example, a combined market share of twenty
per cent has been held to satisfy the requirement of substantiality of prior
competition.20 The instant Court, in making the initial appellate application of section 7 to vertical acquisitions, 21 found the requirement of previous
competition prevailing in cases of horizontal acquisitions to be inappropriate.2 The Court, applying the standard developed under section 3 of the
Clayton Act, which outlaws exclusive dealing contracts where the result
may be to "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce," 2 held that a vertical acquisition violates section 7
whenever there is a reasonable probability that it will foreclose competition
24
in a substantial share of a market of substantial size.
Since one of the results of stock acquisitions proscribed by the section
is the substantial lessening of competition between competing corporations,25 the Court might have limited the applicability of the entire section
18. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F2d 163, 168 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
19. One recent Clayton Act case has held that the requirement of substantial lessening of competition can be met merely by proving that the defendant's share of the
market was substantial. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1948) ;
see REPORT ov THn ATToRNsY GENEA'Sts CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws
141-42 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ResoRT). However, this case involved exclusive
dealing contracts under § 3 of the Clayton Act, and it is generally believed that the
"quantitative substantiality" test cannot alone be sufficient to establish a violation of
§7. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). Sometimes, however, the market share foreclosed may be
so large as to establish a violation by the existence of this one factor alone. See
RFoORT, at 122.

20. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), af'd,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
21. See notes 16 and 17 up ra.
22. Instant case at 595.
23. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
24. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922). Of the three prosscribed results of § 7, it might seem that substantial lessening of competition is a

more inclusive proscription than either restraint of trade or tendency to create a
monopoly. And, since the statute proscribes the first result only where competition is
lessened between the acquired and the acquiring corporations, it might seem that this
standard could have no application in the instant case. However, the Court, in accordance with dicta in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), equated the three phrases. The rationale behind this is apparently that a substantial lessening of competition will bring a company
appreciably closer to monopoly power. See RE'oRT, at 124.
25. See text at note 14 supra Courts have recognized that the section proscribes
three separate results, only one of which requires competition between the corporations
previous to acquisition. Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926). However, even in the same circuit, courts have
previusly differed over whether the ban applies only to competing companies. Compare
luminum Co. v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 407 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616
(1923), with Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
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to acquisitions between competing corporations. 26 However, the Court's
construction of the statutory language appears reasonable 27 Conceding
that a reasonable construction of section 7 afforded the instant Court a
choice of whether or not to include vertical acquisitions within its proscrip28
tion, the Court's interpretation seems justified from a policy standpoint.
If vertical acquisitions can have the effect of substantially lessening competition, then the policy of the antitrust laws would seem to dictate that the
Court construe the statute to include that practice. Such a situation is not
difficult to envision. In the case of a manufacturer who purchases a firm for
whose business he formerly competed, he can then compel this erstwhile free
agent to buy all its requirements from the acquiring firm, thus excluding
29
If
the manufacturer's competitors from this part of the possible market.
26. Any ambiguity has been removed by the 1950 amendment, which makes the inclusion of non-competing acquisitions clear. H.R. Ri. No. 1911, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1949). Therefore, this holding effects only those acquisitions which took place
prior to 1950. For text of new section, see note 14 supra.
27. Emphasizing that the first paragraph of Section 7 is written in the disjunctive,
see note 14 supra, the Court concluded that "not only the corporate acquisition of stock
of a competing corporation" is embraced, "but also the corporate acquisition of stock
of any corporation, competitor or not, where the effect may be either (1) to restrain
commerce in any section or community, or (2) tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce." Instant case at 590-91. Legislative history is not helpful in deciding
whether the section covers acquisitions in companies which do not make the same
products, since the only congressional mention of non-competing corporations came in
connection with an early draft, amended before passage. 51 CONG. REc. 14419 (1914).

It is true, as the dissent argues, that this is the first § 7 proceeding instituted by the
Government which involves companies not offering competing products, instant case
at 615. However, this evidence of administrative interpretation is not persuasive, since
the record for the seven years since the amendment making clear the inclusion of these
acquisitions is similarly devoid of actions against non-horizontal acquisitions. See
Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA.
L. Rnv. 489, 513 (1957). Applying the section to vertical acquisitions is, however, in
conflict with the FTC's ruling. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 6-7, 60 (1929). Section 7 was
amended in 1950. 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952), text at note 14 supra.
The amendment makes clear the inclusion of vertical acquisitions which take place
after the date of the amendment. H.R. REP. No. 1911, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
28. For a discussion of the economic aspects of vertical integration, see Adelman,
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1949) ; Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 COLUM. L. Rzv. 921 (1949). Although § 7 applies only to integration by acquisition rather than by internal expansion, there appears to be a rational basis for this
distinction. Building a new facility results in a greater total productive capacity, which
increases competition and generally can be said to benefit the public by intensifying the
drive towards product improvement and cost reduction. On the other hand, the acquisition of a facility which is already competing in the market cannot result in this
collateral benefit. Some early cases under § 7 applied the Sherman Act "rule of reason"
and required proof that the acquisition was against the public interest. E.g., United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935). However, this contention was laid to rest under § 3 of the Clayton Act (involving exclusive dealing contracts and using the same standard as § 7) by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 311 (1949). The latter case held that Congress had expressed its legislative
determination that such contracts were against the public interest. Neither of the
briefs in the instant case mention the argument.
29. Of course, in the instant case, du Pont had to offer its goods to General Motors
at competitive prices. Otherwise an independent General Motors shareholder might
bring an action against his directors for failure to act in the best interests of the corporation. See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921). However,
even if price, service, and quality were equal among all the suppliers, du Pont could
force General Motors to purchase the major portion of its requirements, thereby foreclosing du Pones competitors from this segment of the market.

120

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106

the acquired firm represented a substantial portion of the market for these
competitors' products, then the acquisition would have the proscribed result.
This construction has the further advantage of bringing within the compass of the antitrust laws anti-competitive transactions difficult to reach
under other provisions. Vertical acquisitions are not per se violations of the
Sherman Act.30 Therefore, it has been necessary in order to make out a
32
31
Sherman Act violation to prove either a conspiracy, a virtual monopoly
or an intent to monopolize,as none of which encompass the risks to competition existing in transactions like that of the instant case. Nor are such
risks within the Clayton Act's restriction in section 3 on exclusive dealing
arrangements, 3 4 which have a competitive impact similar to that of vertical
acquisitions. Finally, the instant decision, by bringing vertical acquisitions within the same standard as is applied to exclusive dealing arrangements, avoids the paradoxical result that would permit a firm to legally
control more of a market by acquisition than by contract where the object
of both is to secure a constant demand at the expense of the firm's
competitors.3 5
The Court's holding that the legality of an acquisition 3 6 may be measured by subsequent events is not compelled by the language of section 7.37
Although another portion of the Clayton Act seems to contemplate a deter30. 26 STrAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952). United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
31. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 15 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1926).
The district court in the instant case found no evidence of conspiracy. 126 F. Supp.
235, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
32. In United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge
Learned Hand said that 90% of the relevant market was sufficient, but doubted that
64% was. In the instant case, du Pont was represented as having about 25%.
33. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The court in the
instant case found no such intent. Instant case at 607.
34. 38 SrAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952). See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). In the instant case, there was no exclusive dealing agreement between du Pont and General Motors.
35. It has been held that exclusive dealing contracts affecting 40% of the market
are struck down by the Clayton Act, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U.S. 346 (1922), but where size is the only offense, acquisition of other companies has not been deemed illegal unless defendant had a virtual monopoly. United
tates v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). See note 32 supra.
36. The Court's holding is not limited to vertical acquisitions. Its reasoning applies equally to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate transactions. In the instant case
the acquisition was in part conglomerate, because du Pont did not make paint in 1917.
They did, however, manufacture a fabric which could be used in automobiles. In Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
901 (1953), bank acquisitions were upheld because the banks were not in substantial
competition. Should the situation in banking change, making the relevant market the
five-state area for which the Government argued, there would then appear to be a
violation on the basis of the holding in the instant case.
37. The wording of the section seems to indicate that acquisition is the offense,
which would mean that the test should be whether there was substantial lessening of
competition at the time of the acquisition. See text at note 14 supra.
Most actions have heretofore been brought at or near the time of purchase. Instant case at 598. See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). However, the Government's action for antitrust violations is subject to neither statute of limitations nor to laches. Dissent in instant case at 622.
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mination of legality by hindsight,3 8 section 7 itself might equally well have
been interpreted to require measurement against conditions contemporary
with the transaction. Such a view would still accord with the purpose
of the Clayton Act to nip incipient monopolies 39 and would also have the
merit of relative certainty. Corporations contemplating an acquisition
would be able to predict with some assurance whether the given transaction
would contravene permissible limits, contrary to the instant rule which
requires either a forebearance of acquisition or an attempt to predict what
course the companies and the markets involved may take in future years.
Although in either case an acquisition of customer, supplier or competitor
would be suspect, under the Court's rule any acquisition may be a potential
violation4 Aside from the future impact of the instant case, the Court's
position also calls into question other acquisitions made in the past. An
evaluation of the Court's choice of alternatives in construing section 7
must, therefore, depend on the retroactive and prospective effects of that
choice.
In threatening all acquisitions which have taken place since 1914, regardless of the size of the companies at the time of the acquisition so long
as they now have a substantial segment of the market, the instant case
would appear to make an arbitrary distinction between corporations of
equal size and economic power. 41 Those corporations whose growth by
acquisition occurred prior to 191442 or whose subsequent growth has
occurred through internal development are to be judged by the less rigorous
Sherman Act test, while those whose growth has occurred through acquisitions since 1914 are to be subject to the Clayton Act standard. However,
regardless of the justifiability 4 of the distinction, its practical impact is
slight. As a result of an early determination by the Supreme Court that
44
section 7 did not apply to acquisition of assets, but only to share capital,
many corporations arranged their post-1914 transactions so as to involve
only an exchange of assets. 45 In other cases assets have subsequently been
38. The third paragraph of § 7 exempts investment purchases, but removes the
STAT. 732 (1914), 15

exemption where the stock is subsequently used to control. 38
U.S.C. § 18 (1952).

39. S. RnP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
40. Purchase for investment, without use to control, remains a defense under
both the new and the old sections. 38 STATr. 732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
41. See Note, 66 YAiE L.J. 1251 (1957).
42. Many of the presently large corporations have made few acquisitions since
1914. FTC, RPOR oN 'Hn Mimaca MOVWXmNT 23 (1948).
43. It is true that the result of the instant case is to create a distinction which
cannot be completely justified. See Note, 66 YAit L.. 1251 (1957). However, the
Court must apply the statute as it finds it and cannot refuse to adopt an interpretation
of it which it believes otherwise necessary solely on the grounds that the result is a distinction which it would not have made as a legislative body. There remains the possibility that Congress will be galvanized into action by the instant case in order to
equalize the present disparity.
44. Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926).
45. E.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The 1950
amendment includes purchase of assets. However, by its terms, it applies only to acquisitions after its enactment. 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952). See note
14 supra.
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transferred from the acquired company, and any attempt at reaching the
past transaction would be fruitless. 46 Moreover, the reluctance of courts
to order the harsh remedies of divorcement, divestiture or dissolution, 47 together with the fact that in any event few if any other corporate situations
resemble in magnitude the du Pont-General Motors relation 48 serve
49
further to limit the retrospective significance of the instant case.
The effect upon contemplated acquisitions, however, may be more
important. No corporation can henceforth be certain when planning an
acquisition that corporate growth may not retroactively make the acquisition a violation of section 7, forcing a possible divestment with its accompanying waste. While it is recognized that the du Pont doctrine provides a
means of reaching concentrations of economic power which may in fact
be harmful and which are not subject to other antitrust provisions,50 the
countervailing consideration would appear to be whether the decision also
inhibits investment that would contribute to the growth and well-being of
the economy. Though the question is not subject to a categorical answer,
a number of generalizations appear possible with respect to certain types
of corporations making certain investments. For example, well diversified
corporations controlling a substantial share of the market in which they sell
or constituting a substantial share of the markets in which they buy may
well be deterred from further growth and diversity through large acquisi46. See United States v. Schenley Industries, Inc., Civil No. 1686, D. Del. The
action was instituted in February, 1955 and complained of the acquisition by Schenley
of controlling stock interest in one of its prominent competitors, Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. By the time a consent decree was entered in April, 1957, Park & Tilford
was a mere shell, since the foreign suppliers for whom it had acted as agent had cancelled their agreements, supposedly to give them to Schenley. The consent decree could
not require divestment; it only prohibited Schenley from acquiring any alcohol concerns for ten years unless it applied to the Attorney General for his approval. See
H.R. REP. No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 n.3 (1957).
47. In more than 60 years of Sherman Act history, only twenty-four cases have
ordered one of these three measures of relief. H.R. REP. No. 486, supra note 46. This
attitude is reflected in United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 904 (D. Md.
1916): "A dislike for useless waste and destruction makes one loath to follow the
authority which may be understood as requiring the breaking up of defendant's organization, in spite of its proven power for good, albeit with serious possibilities for evil."
48. In 1955, General Motors ranked first in sales and second in assets of the nations industrial firms; du Pont was tenth and fourth respectively. Fortune Directory of
the 500 Largest United States Industrial Corporations, July 1956, p. 2.
49. Relevant to these considerations is the introduction into the last session of
Congress of House Bill No. 7698, which would amend § 7 by requiring previous notification to the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission of all mergers
involving total capital, surplus and undivided profits of over ten million dollars, with
certain exceptions. Both corporations involved must give all the following information
which is within their knowledge or control: nature of the business; products or services sold or distributed; total assets; net sales for the past year; and location of
plants or trading areas. The acquisition cannot go forward until 60 days after the
report is in the Government's hands. Failure of either of the agencies to act or to request more information does not waive their right to bring an action at some later
time. In addition, the amendment would give the Federal Trade Commission the power
to seek an injunction prior to the transaction, a power now held only by the Justice
Department. The bill was passed by committee, but never passed the House. See H.R.
R8P..No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 n.3 (1956).
50. See text at notes 30-34 supra.
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tions. 51 Particularly will this be so if the organization to be acquired is
actually, or is capable of being, a customer, supplier or competitor. 52 Even
in the case of conglomerate acquisitions, however, there should be reticence
because of the possibility that a minimum of additional growth may suffice
to place the acquired company in the position of a supplier or customer.
Since it is likely that such corporations have attained or are close to optimum size in their particular fields, no particular economic advantage is to
be gained by the public from their investment in other existing enterprises.53 Even if optimum size is larger than its present size, benefits will
probably not be passed on to the public since the corporation will be large
enough to prevent market competition from materially diminishing price.
But if such corporations are deterred from expansion by acquisition, they
may attain the same ends by internal development. Building rather than
buying, however, may require larger initial investment, 4 and at least with
respect to horizontal and conglomerate development in static industries, will
not be as attractive competitively." If, nevertheless, the decision is made
to build, the public gains in the short run from the addition of new and presumably more efficient productive facilities.
Corporations controlling small market shares should be little deterred by du Pont, even from making horizontal or vertical acquisitions.
The remoteness of the time when they may reach the forbidden limit
may assure them of a sufficient intervening profit to justify the risk
of ultimate divestment. Meanwhile, these acquisitions may assist them
in attaining optimum size with accompanying benefit to the economy.
Moreover, if their acquisitions are conglomerate, the resultant diversity may serve to stabilize their operations which also should redound to
the public's advantage. In balance, it would appear that the du Pont
decision to view acquisitions from the standpoint of conditions prevalent at
the time of suit should not have a serious inhibiting effect upon desirable
investment.R
51. Even if the market share held at the time of acquisition is not sufficient to
make out a violation, little growth may be necessary before the share held can be
called substantial.
52. This is especially important at this time when many corporations are experiencing, or have experienced, periods of diversification. For instance, du Pont has gone
into many new fields, see BURSnm, THx DU PoT INDUSTRIAL. GRoUP 11-12 (1951), and
would be hard put to find another firm which is neither a competitor nor a potential
customer or supplier of its present operations.
53. See generally RLATIVm ErIcriNcY op LARGE, MmruM-Sizn, AND SmAlL
BUSINESS 12-14 (T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 13, 1941).
54. Especially is this true where the transaction involves only the purchase of a
portion of the acquired corporation's stock.
55. When the corporation builds a new plant, it increases the productive facilities
of the industry. On the other hand, if it purchases an existing plant, it removes one
facility with which it would have to compete.
56. It is recognized that the economic analysis presented is greatly simplified and
does not take into account many important factors. However, its purpose is merely to
indicate the type of considerations which seem to suggest that the instant case will not
have a serious deterrent effect.
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Congressional InvestigationsDUE PROCESS REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
TO FURNISH WITNESSES MORE PRECISE STATEMENT
OF QUESTION UNDER INQUIRY THAN IS CONTAINED
IN COMMITTEE AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION
Petitioner, a union official and labor organizer, was subpoened by a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He
testified freely concerning his own past communist affiliations but refused to answer questions concerning persons who had defected from the
communist movement on the grounds that such questions were not relevant
to the work of the committee. Petitioner was convicted in the district court
for refusing to answer questions "pertinent to the question under inquiry," I
and the circuit court affirmed. 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment, holding that the

committee had denied petitioner due process by not adequately revealing
to him the nature of the question under inquiry so that he could determine
whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer. Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).3
Congressional need to gather information by investigation for use in
the legislative process has been implemented by criminal sanctions against
reluctant witnesses. 4 The relevant statute provides that a person summoned
before a congressional committee who "refuses to answer any question
pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." 5 A witness may properly refuse to answer any question
which is not pertinent to the subject under inquiry,6 and the burden of
proving pertinency is on the Government. 7 But a refusal to answer on
these grounds has been, until the instant case, at the peril of the witness,8
since questions not pertinent on their face could be proved at the trial to have
1. REv. STAT. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). Prosecutions
under this statute are handled by the Justice Department, but the witness may also be
tried at the bar of the house of Congress conducting the inquiry. TAYLoR, GRAND INQUZ sT 231 (1955).

2. 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The circuit court in affirming the conviction
denied petitioner's contention that the subcommittee was acting solely for the sake of
exposure and that the first amendment protected petitioner from being forced to reveal
past political affiliations of his one-time associates. Id. at 686. For a discussion of these
issues, see Comments, 10 ARic. L. Rsv. 210 (1956), 9 VAND. L. lrzv. 872 (1956), 42 VA.
L. Rzv. 675 (1956).
3. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result; Justice Clark dissented; Justices
Burton and Whittaker took no part in the determination.
4. Limited immunity has also been granted witnesses before congressional committees to facilitate the gathering of information which might otherwise be withheld
on the grounds that it was self-incriminating. Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486
(Supp. IV, 1957).
5. Rxv. STAT. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
6. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927) (dictum).
7. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296 (1929) (dictum); United States
v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
8. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (good faith refusal to answer is no defense) ; United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 64 (D.D.C. 1947).
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been pertinent at the time of the hearing.9 In delineating the scope of
the "question under inquiry" for the purpose of determining pertinency of
a particular question, courts have resorted to the resolution or statute authorizing the committee's jurisdiction.'
In several instances, when serious
questions concerning the validity of the authorizing resolution or statute
have been raised in view of the constitutional guarantees of the first amendment, courts have construed the resolution or statute narrowly in order to
avoid a constitutional determination, with the result that the particular
query was held to be outside the scope of the authorized congressional
inquiry as defined by the court."' The argument that the wording of the
resolution or statute was too vague for a witness to determine with any
certainty whether an- particular question was pertinent has been repeatedly rejected.12 However, the instant court, recognizing that the
right of the witness to be free from unnecessary harassment must be
balanced with the congressional need for information, accepted this position.
It held that the authorizing resolution of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities which granted jurisdiction over "un-American propaganda . . . and all other questions in relation thereto"

'1

was too broad

to be the basis for establishing the "question under inquiry" in a particular
hearing and that due process required a more precise statement by the
committee describing the nature of the current investigation and the
manner in which the propounded questions were pertinent to that inquiry
so that the witness might determine with reasonable certainty whether re[usal to answer would subject him to a criminal penalty.' 4
The instant court's construction of "the question under inquiry" will
help to eliminate harassment and possible jeopardy to witnesses from
questions which might well be within the broad jurisdiction conferred on
the committee and yet irrelevant to the area of current congressional interest. Furthermore, the requirement of a precise statement of the scope
of committee inquiry and the manner in which a particular question is
pertinent thereto will enable counsel for the witness to perform his function
of advising the witness of his right not to disclose irrelevant information.
It will also give courts trying contempt indictments a more concrete stand9. United States v. Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832, 837 (D.D.C. 1957) ; United States
v. Singer, 139 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.D.C. 1956).
10. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; Bowers v. United States,
202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 934
(D.D.C. 1957).
11. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) ("lobbying activities" construed to include only representations made directly to Congress, not attempts to sway
public opinion); cf. United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956)
("government activities" construed to exclude defense plants).
12. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 838 (1948); United States v. Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832 (D.D.C. 1957).
13. H. Rs. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. RFC. 15, 18 (1953).
14. Instant case at 214-15. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948). Should Congress try to circumvent the procedural requirements imposed by the instant case by
amending the relevant statute to require only pertinency to the area of jurisdiction
conferred by Congress a due process attack based on the vagueness of the authorizing
resolutions might prevail.
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ard by which to judge guilt or innocence. 15 The burden imposed on
investigating committees by the instant decision appears to be slight since
the Court indicated that a relatively broad statement would be acceptable.' 6
For example, had the subcommittee in the instant case made it clear to the
witness that the inquiry concerned communist infiltration in labor and that
the questions were designed to determine the extent of this infiltration,
instead of giving the evasive answer that the subcommittee was investigating
"subversion and subversive propaganda," 17 the Court would have been
satisfied that the requirements of due process in this regard had been met.'8
The holding of the instant case may have broader implications than
merely protection of witnesses from questions irrelevant to the current subject of congressional inquiry. Where prejudice to the individual outweighs
a remote congressional need for information sought from the witness, due
process would seem to protect the witness from being compelled to answer
even though the question was relevant to the current inquiry and not selfincriminating. 19 Although courts have consistently decried legislative
investigation solely for the purpose of exposure, m broad authorization of
committee jurisdiction 21 has made it virtually impossible for the courts to
find that no valid legislative need was being served by detailed questions
15. The situation presented in -the instant case is not limited in application to the
House Committee on Un-American Activities since the committee jurisdictions conferred by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60
STAT. 812, (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 31, 33, 40, 44 U.S.C.) are necessarily
broad to permit the routing of bills for consideration. E.g., The Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare is given jurisdiction over "public welfare generally," the Committee on the Armed Services over "common defense generally," and the Committee on
the Judiciary over "civil liberties." To require that the authorizing resolution set out
with particularity the intended scope of each investigative undertaking would necessitate the use of ad hoc committees which have been criticized on the grounds that the
person who proposes the resolution invariably is appointed chairman, regardless of his
qualifications.
16. Instant case at 212-14.
17. Instant case at 214.
18. In light of the view of the subject under inquiry taken by the Government it
would seem that even questions concerning persons completely unconnected with the
labor movement were not pertinent even if all procedural requirements had been met
by the Committee. A recent case has held on the authority of the instant case that the
vague authority, i.e., to investigate "subversive activities," of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the failure of the chairman to make clear to the witness the
question under inquiry violated due process. United States v. Peck, 26 U.S.L. WiK
1009 (D.D.C. July 16, 1957).
19. In articulating its awareness that prejudice to the individual is a primary factor in determining the proper scope 'of congressional inquiry the instant Court stated
that "there was no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." Instant
case at 200. The Court went on to state that "remoteness of subject can be aggravated
by a probe for a depth of detail even farther removed from any basis of legislative
action.' Instant case at 204. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), decided the same day as the instant case, the Court reversed a contempt conviction for
refusal to answer questions before a state legislative investigating committee on the
grounds that due process required a clear showing that the legislature wanted the information sought in light of prejudice to the witness from public exposure of his
private affairs. Id. at 254.
20. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
21. See note 15 supra.
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into the private affairs of the witness. 22 The procedural requirement of a
more precise statement of the subject under inquiry imposed by the instant
case would seem to give the courts a more definite yardstick by which to
measure the remoteness of the congressional need for the information requested in light of the hurt to the witness from public exposure of his
private affairs.

Constitutional LawSTATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION EXTENDS TO MATTER
INCRIMINATING UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A witness before a state grand jury refused to answer certain questions
concerning communist activities on the ground that the answers might tend
to incriminate him. The questions 1 were certified to the trial judge who
ruled that the witness was privileged not to answer. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that although the answers could not incriminate the
witness under state law, 2 the privilege against self-incrimination granted
by the state constitution 3 extended to matter tending to incriminate under
federal law. 4 Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1957).
The privilege against self-incrimination had its origin in English
common law 5 and is embodied in the fifth amendment of the federal constitution. Although the fourteenth amendment does not require the
states to grant the privilege,0 it is included in the constitutions of all but
two of the states.7 The privilege is applicable to grand jury proceedings 8
and legislative investigationsO as well as to criminal trials, and both wit22. Chase, Improving Congressional Investigations: A No-Progress Report, 30
T4mp. L.Q. 126, 140 (1957).
1. "Do you know whether or not Carl Braden is a Communist? Did you ever

attend any meeting in Carl Braden's house relative to Communism. . . ?" Instant case
at 302.
2. The court had previously held that the state sedition statute was inoperative
since under the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), Congress
had preempted the field. Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956).
3. Ky. Co ST. § 11, provides that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . .
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself... " The privilege thus granted
is applicable to a witness before a grand jury. Frain v. Applegate, 239 Ky. 605, 40
S.W.2d 274 (1931).
4. Sedition is made criminal by the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
5. 8 WIGmORE, EvmENcE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
7. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2252. In the two remaining states it is regarded as part of the common law. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935
(1902). State v. Zdanowicz, 69 NJ.L. 620, 55 AtI. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
8. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; Frain v. Applegate, 239 Ky. 605,
40 S.W.2d 274 (1931).
9. United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951); United States v.
Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1951); see also Note, 49 COLUm. L. RFv. 87 (1949).
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nesses 10 and those accused of crimes 11 can avail themselves of it. However, the privilege can be overcome and a witness compelled to testify when
the danger of prosecution is removed by a statutory grant of immunity
from prosecution, 12 provided such immunity is as broad as the protection
afforded by the privilege itself. 13 Whether the privilege extends to matter
incriminating only under the law of another jurisdiction has been the subject of conflicting judicial opinion. 14 The federal law on the question was
apparently settled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock,15
which tacitly overruled prior federal decisions 16 recognizing the existence
of a privilege where there was reasonable probability of ensuing state
prosecution. The Court held that the protection of the fifth amendment
did not apply to matter incriminating only under the law of another
jurisdiction, basing its decision on the English precedents 1 7 and the
reasoning that the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns,
10. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). In applying the privilege to
grand jury proceedings Kentucky has apparently disregarded the plain wording of the
state constitution by extending the privilege to a mere witness. See Frain v. Applegate,
239 Ky. 605, 40 S.W.2d 274 (1931).
11. While a mere witness can be compelled to divulge non-incriminating information, an accused cannot be compelled to testify to any matter. 8 Wimoao,
op. cit.
supra note 5, § 2268.
12. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605 (1896). For the same reason the privilege
does not apply when the danger has been removed by acquittal, Holt v. State, 39 Tex.
Crim. 282, 45 S.W. 1016 (1898), or expiration of the time for prosecution, Weldon v.
Burch, 12 Ill.
374 (1851).
13. Under federal law a statute which merely provides that compelled testimony
shall not be used against the witness in a criminal prosecution is unconstitutional because it permits such testimony to be used -to discover other evidence which is admissible. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The state courts are divided on
the question of the constitutionality of such statutes. See In re Kelly, 200 Pa. 430, 50
AtI. 248 (1901) (constitutional); People er rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253,
68 N.E. 353 (1903) (unconstitutional).
14. Privilege granted: Ballmaun v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906) (petitions charging witness with criminal activities previously filed in state court); United States v.
Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828) (testimony in federal court subjected witness to danger of state prosecution) ; In re Nachman, 114 Fed. 995 (D.S.C. 1902)
(witness privileged not to testify to state activities even though federal statute granted
immunity from federal prosecution); People er rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 55 App. Div.
245, 67 N.Y. Supp. 492 (3d Dep't 1900) (immunity granted by state statute insufficient when same conduct criminal under federal law). Privilege denied: Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372 (1905) (state immunity statute did not protect witness from state prosecution).; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (federal statute construed to grant
immunity from both federal and state prosecution); State v. March, 46 N.C. 526
(1854) (witness required to testify as to offense committed in another state).
15. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
16. Compare Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906) (petitions charging witness
with criminal activities previously filed in state court) ; United States v. Saline Bank,
26 U.S. (1 Pet) 100 (1828) (inquiry sought to establish identity of notes allegedly
issued by unincorporated bank in violation of state law), with Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S.
372 (1905) (the Court refused to view the danger of federal prosecution as real);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (federal statute granted immunity from state
prosecution).
17. King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N.S.) 1050, 61 Eng. Rep.
116 (1851) ; Queen v. Boyes, 1 B.&S. 311, 21 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861). The Court ignored
the later English case of United States v. McCrae, L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867) in which the
privilege was granted upon a showing that the danger of prosecution in the United
States was substantial.
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neither of which may interfere with the law enforcement process of the
other.' 8 Subsequent federal cases, however, suggest that the Murdock rule
may no longer have vitality.19 State courts which have ruled on the question in construing their constitutions, are predominantly in accord with the
Murdock rule, rather than with the instant case.20
The privilege against self-incrimination has been characterized as a
societal judgment that the dignity of the individual prohibits compelling a
person to testify in a manner that might tend to be incriminatory to him.2 '
It is readily conceded that matters of inquiry in one jurisdiction may be of
interest to law enforcement officials in another.2 2 Further, there is reasonable probability that information divulged in one jurisdiction will be dis18. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). The Court apparently accepted
state law, a state would thereafter be able to place information beyond the reach of
the argument that were the privilege to be extended to matter incriminating only under

federal authorities by making the conduct to which the information related criminal.
In this sense, the state would be interfering with the federal fact-finding process. The
interference, however, stems initially not from state action but from the decision by the
federal government not to avail itself of information at the cost of subjecting the witness to the danger of state prosecution. Moreover, even under an extended privilege,
the information remains available to federal authorities provided it is covered by a
statute granting immunity from state prosecution. See text and note at note 12 supra,
and note 29 infra.
19. In United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952), the court
refused to apply the Murdock rule to a legislative investigation into state crime. See
also Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952). The Federal Immunity
Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. IV, 1957), by granting immunity from state as
well as from federal prosecution, may have rendered the question moot in inquiries relating to matters of national security. Court approval of the grant must be obtained in
each case, however, and the willingness of the courts to grant such approval when the
subject of inquiry relates to matter criminal only under state law may be questionable.

20. Accord, People ex rel. Butler Street Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N.E.
349 (1903) ; Ferris v. Lockett, 175 Kan. 704, 267 P.2d 190 (1954) ; Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345 (1928); State v. Ruff, 176 Minn. 308, 223 N.W. 144
(1929) ; In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 176 (1952); State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St.
529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956) ; State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl. 697 (1926); In re
Greenleaf, 176 Misc. 566, 28 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Ex parte Copeland, 91 Tex.
Crim. 549, 240 S.W. 314 (1922); contra, People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29
N.W.2d 284 (1947); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954)
(dictum); State ex tel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949) (privilege
granted to witness under indictment in another state).

21. GRiswoLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). The wide use of immunity
statutes, which protect the witness from prosecution but not from disgrace, would appear to cast doubt on the correctness of the Griswold formulation. Wigmore considers
the privilege as a safeguard against institution of the civil law inquisitorial method of
prosecution, rejected by the common law in favor of the accusatorial method. 8 Wiamopx, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2251. Although the Wigmore position is posited on a loss
of information to the state, when the issue is extension of the privilege to matter incriminating only in another jurisdiction, both positions require a balancing of gain to
the individual against detriment to the state. Some authorities contend that the privilege
should be completely abolished. See McCoRM Ici, EViDnNCs 288-90 (1954); Note, 61
YALE L.J. 105, 110 n.25 (1952).
22. A state antitrust proceeding may reveal violation of the federal antitrust laws.
See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). A state bribery investigation may reveal
violations of federal tax law. See Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489
(1931). Cross-examination to discredit a witness in a state proceeding may necessitate
an admission of criminal conduct in another state. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 128
Va. 698, 104 S.E. 853 (1920). A state civil proceeding may reveal a use of the mails to
defraud. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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closed to the authorities of another. The publicity attendant upon legislative hearings,2 cooperation between law enforcement officials of various
jurisdictions not amounting to a collusive attempt to circumvent the
privilege,2 4 and the apparent power of state officials to turn over the
results of grand jury proceedings to the authorities of the federal and
other state governments 25 all tend to effect such disclosure. In addition,
information rendered by a witness, even though compelled under an immunity statute of one jurisdiction, can be used by another in bringing
action against the witness. 20 In view of this situation, the extension of the
privilege against self-incrimination to matter which might tend to incriminate the witness in another jurisdiction would appear to be reasonable
provided it does not materially impair the ability of the state to obtain

needed information

27
m

The state is legitimately interested in obtaining all information relevant to its subject of inquiry,2 8 whether that information is to the witness

non-incriminating, incriminating within the jurisdiction, or incriminating
only in another jurisdiction. The witness will have little interest in refusing
23. The Kefauver Committee estimated that its New York hearings were viewed
on television by upwards of 30,000,000 people. S. Rtp. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1951). See also United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
24. Were it -toamount to collusion, use of the information by the other jurisdiction
might constitute a denial of due process. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487
(1944).
25. In at least thirteen states, including Kentucky, a transcript of grand jury proceedings is required by statute. Morse, Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L.
R.zv. 295, 331 (1931). In one of these, Arizona, disclosure may be made by the prosecuting attorney only for the purposes of impeaching the witness. ARiz. Cona ANN.

§ 44-630 (1939). In another, New York, a court order is required before disclosure
can be made. N.Y. CODX CRIM. PRoc. § 952-t. Such an order has been granted to permit use of the transcript by the federal government. See it re Attorney Gen., 160 Misc.
533, 291 N.Y. Supp. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1936). In the remaining states, the transcript is

given to the prosecuting attorney with no qualifications. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS

c. 277, § 10 (1956) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.956 (1954) ; cf. FED. R. Cain. P. 6(e) ;
Doe v. Rosenberry, 152 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (disclosure of testimony before
federal grand jury made to grievance committee of state bar association inquiring into
conduct of witness).
26. Such information may be of use both as evidence upon which a conviction may
be based, or as a means of discovering such evidence. Since the testimony itself, even
though compelled under a state immunity statute, is admissable against the witness in
a federal criminal prosecution, Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), a
fortiori it may be used to discover other evidence. In the only state case involving the
question, testimony compelled in a federal proceeding was held inadmissable. Clark
v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 So. 135 (1914). The Florida rule, however, does not necessarily prevent the use of the testimony to discover other evidence.
27. Recognition of the privilege under any circumstances tends to deprive factfinding bodies of information which would aid in the ascertainment of truth. McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 21, at 288. That this information is needed is emphasized by
the fact that legislatures have long been willing to grant immunity from prosecution
in exchange for the information. For a history and compilation of state and federal
immunity statutes, see 8 WiGmoRS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2281.
28. The Supreme Court has apparently attempted to enforce federal due process
requirements on the scope of committee investigations by both federal and state governments. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (federal), 106 U. PA. L. Rrv.
124 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (state).

1957]

RECENT CASES

to divulge non-incriminating information. However, his estimate of the
probability that he will be forced to divulge incriminating matter which
will be used against him in a subsequent prosecution will govern the extent
of his efforts to avoid appearing at all and, if he does appear, the possibility
of his risking contempt by refusing to answer. If the state refuses to
extend the privilege to matter which might tend to incriminate in another
jurisdiction, it will run the risk of successful evasion of process which will
deny to it the benefit of any non-incriminating information which the
witness may possess, in addition to any matter which, although it might
tend to show a violation of the law of the state, could be compelled under
an immunity statute.29 If the privilege is extended, the possibility that the
witness will attempt to avoid process will be diminished. Once the witness
appears, non-incriminating material and matter which might tend to incriminate him within that jurisdiction will be divulged. Refusal to extend
the privilege will result additionally in the obtaining of information incriminating in another jurisdiction whenever the danger of prosecution in the
other jurisdiction is not sufficiently great to induce the witness to stand in
contempt rather than divulge the information. If the privilege is extended,
on the other hand, the chances of obtaining such information are lessened,
since the witness will invoke the privilege freely. Thus, evaluating the
desirability of extending the privilege in terms of the state's fact-finding
process entails a determination of whether the loss of information which
might tend to incriminate a witness in another jurisdiction is as great
an injury to the state as is the loss of all information from a witness through
the successful evasion of process. Although it appears probable that free
exercise of an extended privilege may cause greater loss of information
than evasion of process in the absence of the extended privilege, such a
determination must necessarily be imprecise, and the likelihood of the
state being in a markedly worse position under one alternative as opposed
to the other is small. On the other hand, extending the privilege at least
has the positive advantage of aiding the individual. Measuring this
against the slight difference in effect upon the state in either extending or
not extending the privilege, the result reached in the instant case appears
correct 80
29. A state, of course, has no power to grant immunity from prosecution by an-

other state or by the federal government. On the other hand, the federal government

may grant immunity from prosecution by a state, at least in areas such as sedition,
in which its interest is paramount. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).

30. At a minimum it would appear desirable to extend the privilege when the

likelihood of prosecution in the foreign jurisdiction is great. For example, where
prosecution in another jurisdiction is already in progress, the individual's need for
protection is clear. See Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906) ; State ex rel. Doran
v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949) ; People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29
N.W.2d 284 (1947). Similarly, where the questions propounded are specifically directed
toward criminal activity in the foreign jurisdiction, prosecution becomes more likely
and protection is needed. See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952) ;
United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952). The absence of the
above indications, of course, does not compel a conclusion that no danger exists. See
text and notes at notes 22 to 26 supra.
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Constitutional LawREFUSAL OF POLICE COMMISSIONER TO PERMIT
SHOWING OF FILM ON GROUND OF OBSCENITY UPHELD
A Chicago ordinance makes it unlawful to exhibit motion picture
films without first securing a permit from the commissioner of police, who
is required to deny the permit if the picture is "immoral or obscene." I
Provision is made for final appeal to the mayor.2 Defendant commissioner
of police refused to grant plaintiff a permit to exhibit a particular film on
the ground that the film was not acceptable to standards of decency 3 and
defendant mayor sustained the denial on the ground that the film was immoral and obscene. 4 On complaint to the United States district court, the

ordinance was held not to be void for vagueness under the fourteenth
amendment nor an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of speech under
the first amendment.5 The circuit court affirmed. 6 Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957), petition for cert. filed, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 3067 (U.S. Aug. 27, 1957) (No. 372).
The first amendment's protection of freedom of speech and press,
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment,7 is inclusive of
motion pictures,8 but the constitutional protection afforded any of the media
of communication is not absolutef In Roth v.United States 10 the Supreme
Court held that obscene matter is "not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press." 11 However, attempts to prevent distribution
of obscene material have met two constitutional objections. The first,
formulation of a standard for judging obscenity sufficiently definite to
withstand the attack of vagueness,' 2 has been obviated by the test for
1. Chicago Municipal Code, c. 155, § 1-7.
2. Id. § 4.
3. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 139 F. Supp. 837, 839 (N.D. I1. 1956).
4. Ibid.
5. 139 F. Supp. 837, 841 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
6. Although the district court applied only the first amendment to plaintiff's freedom of speech argument, the circuit court properly applied the first amendment through
the fourteenth, as the first pertains only to federal action. See Palko v. Connecticut,

302 U.S. 319 (1937).

7. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (dictum). Cf. Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
9. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ; Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 369-70, 373 (1927); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
10. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11. Id. at 485. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (dictum); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum).
12. See Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring a censorship board to disapprove films found to be
"obscene, indecent, or immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals") ; Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York, 346 U.S. 587
(1954) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring suppression of films that are
"immoral" or "would tend to corrupt morals"); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department
of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (holding unconstitutional a statute interpreted as
authorizing restraint of a film "on account of being harmful"); Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (1952) (holding unconstitutional a statute restricting films "of such
character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people"); Winters v. New
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obscenity promulgated by the Court in Roth.'3 The second pitfall to
restraint of obscene matter has been the reluctance of the Supreme Court
to uphold restraints on communication prior to dissemination. 14 In Near
v. Minnesota'5 the Supreme Court held invalid under the fourteenth
amendment a state statute empowering the courts of that state to enjoin
dissemination of future issues of a publication after determining that past
issues of the publication were scandalous and defamatory. The Court
characterized the restraint as "of the essence of censorship," 16 and in
dictum indicated that subsequent punishment is the appropriate remedy
for dealing with abuse of constitutional privilege.' 7 Recently, however,
in Alberts v. California18 the Court upheld against constitutional attack
a state statute making it a misdemeanor to "lewdly keep for sale obscene
and indecent books." 19 And in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,20 decided
Yorl, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)

(holding unconstitutional a statute that was interpreted

as prohibiting distribution of magazines found "indecent and obscene" because the
magazines "massed" stories of bloodshed and lust to incite crimes).
13. "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest." 354 U.S. at 489. Chief Justice Warren, concurring, would have preferred
a test focusing on the use to which the material was put as opposed to a test concerned with the material itself. Id. at 495-96. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Roth and
concurring in Alberts, expresses doubt that the statutory definitions at issue in the
two cases are reconcilable with that adopted by the Court. Id. at 498-500. Justice
Douglas, dissenting, with whom Justice Black concurred, objected that the standards
prescribed by the Court inflicted punishment "for thoughts provoked, not for overt
acts nor antisocial conduct." Id. at 509.
The ordinance in the instant case has been interpreted by the highest court of
the state of Illinois. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 121
N.E.2d 585 (1954). The interpretation placed upon the ordinance accords with the
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Roth. 354 U.S. at 489, n.26. No attack on
the ordinance on grounds of vagueness would therefore appear possible.
14. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) ("[T]he main purpose of such
constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all . . . previous restraints upon publications
as had been practiced by other governments."'); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
713-14 (1931) ("In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has
been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication."); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rzv. 533, 539 (1951), calling
for a pragmatic assessment of -the doctrine of prior restraint in particular circumstances, and the Supreme Court's acceptance of Professor Freund's conclusion in
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
15. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16. Id. at 713.
17. Id. at 720.
18. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Roth and Alberts cases were decided by a single
opinion. In the former, the constitutionality of 18 U.S:C. § 1461 (1952), making punishable the mailing of material that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . or
other publication of an indecent character," and Roth's conviction thereunder were
sustained. In the Alberts case the constitutionality of CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311
(West 1955), making it a misdemeanor to keep for sale or for advertising material what
is "obscene or indecent," and Alberts' conviction thereunder, were sustained. justice
Harlan concurred in Alberts but dissented in the Roth case ". . . for the interests
which obscenity statutes purportedly protect are primarily entrusted to the care, not
of the Federal Government, but of the States" and "... the dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the States may do." 354 U.S. at 504-05.
Justice Douglas, with Justice Black, dissented, denying that obscenity is beyond the
pale of the first amendment.
19. CAL. Pre. CODE ANN. § 311 (West 1955).
20. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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the same day as Alberts, the Court sustained a state statute permitting the
enjoining pendente lite of the distribution of allegedly obscene matter.21 The
statute provided for trial within one day of "joinder of issue" and for a
decision by the court within two days of conclusion of the trial. 22 Distinguishing Near v. Minnesota on its facts, 23 the Court rejected the test of
prior restraint as conclusive of the result 24 and, instead, based its holding
on a determination that the restraint was no greater in effect than that
upheld in Alberts.2 5 The instant case, decided just prior to Alberts and
Kingsley, appears to involve a restraint markedly different in impact than
26
the restraint sustained in either of those cases.
In Alberts and Kingsley, though enforcement of the statutes there
upheld lay in the hands of the executive, determination of the issue of
obscenity was made by the judiciary. Under the instant ordinance the
local police chief is empowered to determine whether a film is obscene and
to enforce that determination by refusing to issue a license to exhibit the
film. This merger of functions in one person may well operate to the
detriment of the distributor and the public, there being no safeguard against
over-zealous enforcement as in the other two cases. The effect of the
risk of bias engendered by the police chief's dual role is further magnified
by the difficulties inherent in the subject matter itself. Under any proposed test, the distinction between obscene and non-obscene matter is
uRim. Paoc. § 22-a.
22. Ibid.
23. 354 U.S. at 445.
24. Id. at 441-42.
25. Id. at 442-44. Chief Justice Warren dissented in Kingsley on the grounds that
the statute lacked a standard for judging the book in its setting. "It is the manner
of use that should determine obscenity." 354 U.S. at 445-46. Justice Douglas, joined
by Justice Black and Justice Brennan, dissented on the ground that the injunction
pendente lite, issued without hearing and without any ruling or finding on the issue
of obscenity, violated the first amendment. He found further violation of that amendment in that the statute effected a state-wide decree, not allowing for different use
of the subject matter in various parts of the state, nor community differences in opinion on what is obscene. 354 U.S. at 446-47. Justice Brennan objected in his own dissent, to the absence of a provision in the statute for jury determination of the issue
of obscenity. 354 U.S. at 447-48.
26. There has been no apparent judicial distinction between movies and books.
"It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways,
ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures
as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to
entertain as well as to inform. As was said in Winters v. New York . . . 'The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that
basic right (a free press). Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through
fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.' It is urged that
motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit.
We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for
profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have
any different effect in the case of motion pictures. It is further urged that motion
pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis,
it does not follow that motion pictures should be disqualified from First Amendment
protection. If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled
censorship such as we have here." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501-02.
21. N.Y. CoDS
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tenuous at best.2 7 It would seem that the danger in reposing the combination of functions in a single individual dealing with an illusory distinction should require, at the minimum, an independent determination of
the issue of "obscenity," such as provided in both Kingsley and Alberts.
Even if the police chief were capable of rendering an impartial decision,
the ordinance in the instant case is subject to attack on broader grounds.
The ordinance provides that all motion pictures are subject to scrutiny
prior to dissemination whereas in Kingsley and Alberts only suspect matter was examined prior to dissemination 2 8 As a practical matter, by
requiring prior inspection of all films, the initiative is placed upon the
individual motion picture exhibitor to come forward prepared to convince
29
the authority responsible for issuing permits that the film is not obscene.
If any value exists in permitting expression of ideas to the public, it would
seem that exertion of the police power to restrain such dissemination
should be accompanied, at least, by the burden of proving that the particular vehicle of expression is violative of a valid public interest.
Furthermore, the absence of a provision for rapid determination of the issue
of obscenity may be so competitively prejudicial to the distributor as to
prevent showing of a particular film, regardless of the ultimate decision.
The opportunities for abuse in such a system are manifest and dictate that
control over a medium of communication should be exercised only with
attendant procedural safeguards. Although each of the objections noted
appears in itself to be sufficient to overturn the ordinance, the combination
of them should make reversal of the instant decision obligatory.

Labor LawDUTY OF DISCRIMINATORILY DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE
TO MITIGATE DAMAGES IN ACTION FOR BACK PAY
EXTENDED TO REQUIRE SEARCH FOR LESS THAN
SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT EMPLOYMENT AFTER
PASSAGE OF REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME
Defendant employer discharged several unskilled knitting mill workers,
two of whom remained unemployed for approximately two years. The
27. In Roth, the Court rejected previously applied tests of whether or not a clear

and present danger of anti-social conduct will be created by the material, and the
judging of material merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly sus-

ceptible persons. 354 U.S. at 486, 488-89. The Court noted the relevance of how the
questioned material is used by referring to the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, comments,
which explain -that an appeal to the prurient interest "is especially likely if the ma-

terial is presented in a sly, leering manner, or in vulgar terms manifestly chosen
merely to shock or titillate the reader" and that it is deterrence of "deliberate stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from the conflict between social

convention and the individual's sex drive" which is aimed at by the proposed legislation. Id. at 487.
28. The statute considered in Alberts was also a prior restraint in that it makes

mere writing, printing, or keeping for sale, or similar acts precedent to dissemination of obscene material a misdemeanor. CAL. PsN. CODn ANN. § 311 (West 1955).
29. There is no provision for either a hearing or judicial review in the ordinance.
Chicago Municipal Code, c. 155, § 1-7.
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NLRB determined that the discharges were discriminatory in violation of
the Labor Management Relations Act,' and ordered the workers reinstated with back pay.2 The two who had remained unemployed were unable to reach an agreement with the employer on the amount of back pay
due them and sought NLRB determination of the amount. The Board
held that although such employees have an obligation to minimize the
damages resulting from a discriminatory discharge, this obligation had
been satisfied in that the employees had made reasonable efforts to find
substantially equivalent employment.3 The circuit court denied enforcement, holding that an employee who has failed to find a substantially
equivalent position after a reasonable search must make an effort to obtain
other suitable employment, even though this might mean taking a lower
paying position. NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697 (6th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3111 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1957)

(No. 206).
The NLRB has discretionary power in cases in which an employer
has discriminatorily discharged an employee to issue an order requiring
"reinstatement . . . with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of the [Labor Management Relations] Act." - Imposition of such
an order with payment of back wages is intended to reimburse the employee
for damages which he suffered as a result of the discriminatory discharge.5
Wages earned by the employee during the period of illegal discharge are
deducted from the employer's obligations under the order, 6 but compensation is required for employee expenditures in obtaining interim employment. 7 Initially, the employee was under no obligation to mitigate
damages by seeking other employment during the period of discharge.8
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952). The act is designed "to prescribe the legitimate rights
of both employees and employers in their relations ....
61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
2. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1 (1952), enforcement granted, 209
F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
3. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769 (1956).
4. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 147 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1952).
5. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946). See Notes, 50 YALS L.J.
507, 510-11 (1941), 48 YALE L.J. 1265 (1939).
6. Western Felt Works, 10 N.L.R.B. 407 (1938). Strike and relief benefits are
not considered earnings and therefore are not deducted from back pay due. Vegetable
Oil Products Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 52 (1938); Sterling Corset Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938).
Payments for employment on work-relief programs also are not considered earnings,
insofar as the employer is concerned, but the amount earned on such projects is deducted from the pay due and paid to that agency which supplied the funds for the
project. Empire Furniture Corp., 10 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1939).
7. Crossett Lumber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 440 (1938). Payment was to be "equal to
that which each would normally have earned as wages . . . less the net earnings of
each . ..

remaining after deductions of expenses." Id. at 496. ".

.

. [T]hey incurred

expenses such as for transportation, room and board, which they would not have
incurred had they continued to work for the respondent ...

."

Id. at 498.

8. Western Felt Works, 10 N.L.R.B. 407 (1938). Contracts doctrine requires
mitigation when an employee is discharged in breach of a contract of employment
only to the extent of seeking equivalent employment. Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass.
100, 104 N.E. 271 (1914) and cases collected in 28 A.L.R. 736, 141 A.L.R. 662. Texas
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However, the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 9 limited
employee recovery to exclude damages "willfully incurred." 10 The Board
has subsequently defined "willfully incurred" to include, inter alia, failure
to exert reasonable effort to seek "substantially equivalent employment." 11
The instant case extends the category of damages which are "willfully
incurred" to include a failure to search for "suitable" or "satisfactory"
employment after the passage of a "reasonable" period of time spent in an
12
unsuccessful search for "substantially equivalent" employment.
By requiring that a discriminatorily discharged employee make a
wider search, and accept less desirable positions than has heretofore been
necessary to qualify for maximum back pay recovery, the instant case
would appear to place an additional burden on him. Practically, however,
the additional burden on most such employees is slight. The uncertainty
that the discharge will subsequently be determined to have been discriminatory when coupled with the employee's necessity to maintain a cash inflow should stimulate him to seek other sorts of employment when
substantially equivalent work is not available. It is, thus, only with regard
to those employees who are either not inclined to work or who are under
no economic compulsion to work that the instant case has major impact,
since such employees are not as likely to exert effort to find less desirable
positions in the absence of equivalent employment.'3
In determining whether these employees should be encouraged to
seek other employment by a more stringent mitigation requirement the
is contra to this view and follows the holding in the instant case. Kramer v. Wolf
Cigar Stores Co., 99 Tex. 597, 91 S.W. 775 (1906), and cases collected in 28 A.L.R.
744, 141 A.L.R. 668. It does not appear, however, that the periods of unemployment
considered in the contracts cases were as lengthy as in the instant case. In Hussey v.

Holloway, supra, it was within the province of the jury to decide whether it was jus-

tifiable for the discharged employee to refuse offers for work at a lower pay than that
from which she was discharged. "His recovery will not be diminished because he fails
to engage in a business that is not of the same general character as that for which he
contracted . .. ." 5 Wiuxsrox, CoNTRAcrs § 1359 (2d ed. 1937).
9. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
10. Id. at 198.
11. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725 (1943), enforcement granted, 144
F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945). ". . . [W]e shall . . .
permit... evidence not only on whether a dischargee has unjustifiably refused to
accept, or has given up, desirable new employment, but also on whether he has made
a reasonable effort to obtain such employment." Registration with United States Employment Service was held to be conclusive proof of "reasonable efforts" to obtain
new employment. This test evolved during the manpower shortages of World War II.
Id. at 729. State employment services were later included in this test, Harvest Queen
Mill & Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320, 322 (1950), but later decisions overthrew this
standard, holding that such registration was evidence of the reasonableness of the
search, but was no longer conclusive. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769
(1956), 105 U. PA. L. REv. 1012 (1957); NLRB v. Pugh & Barr Inc., 207 F.2d
409 (4th Cir. 1953), 52 MIcH. L. Rzv. 923 (1954).
12. Instant case at 700. See NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702
(4th Cir. 1955) (agricultural employment held satisfactory for lumber mill workers
who were under duty to seek employment on farms after a discriminatory discharge).
13. The trial examiner in the instant case found that employment opportunities
existed during the tvo year period of discharge in a processing plant and retail stores,
which were considered satisfactory employment for the fired employees. Southern Silk
Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 778, 786 (1956). In addition there was evidence that
both of the workers' husbands were employed during the time of the discharge. Id. at
781, 782.
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purpose of the back pay award must be examined. If the primary purpose
of awarding back pay following discriminatory discharge is to penalize the
employer for his ill-advised conduct and thus to deter him in the future
from similar conduct, such purpose would be served better by limiting the
mitigation doctrine to a requirement of seeking "substantially equivalent"
employment or by abandoning the mitigation doctrine entirely. On the
other hand, if the primary purpose of the back pay award is to save the
discriminatorily discharged employee from loss, a requirement that he seek
less desirable employment after a fruitless search for equivalent employment would not be inconsistent with that purpose. Judicial interpretation
suggests that the act is, in fact, more concerned with the 'compensatory
aspects of back pay awards than with the deterrent effect that they may
have,14 apparently justifying the instant decision. However, any increase in
the burden on a discriminatorily discharged employee should be with recognition that under conditions of relatively full employment the likelihood that
such an employee will find other work is high and the employer's potential
back pay liability is therefore small. Lessening the employer's financial
risk may encourage management use of the discharge as a device to combat
tensions between it and labor, a development contrary to the expressed
policy of the LMRA against discriminatory discharges. 15 Nevertheless, it
is believed that wise administration of the new standard can take into
account this danger and avert it, while limiting the employer's liability in
16
an extreme situation such as the one presented by the instant case.'
The NLRB can expect two types of problems in administering the
new standard of mitigation. The first is the increased administrative workload occasioned by the need to consider a wider range of evidence. Employers may be expected to resist liability by demonstrating that a variety
of other jobs existed in the community, and employees, in order to show
that they are entitled to back pay, will present evidence of their efforts to
find employment other than "substantially equivalent" employment. Although this problem may be a serious one, it presents difficulties only
quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from those which the
14. The purpose of the back pay order cannot be accurately described as wholly
compensatory since there is a certain punitive and preventive aspect of the remedy.
The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), embodies the same phrase
in granting to the NLRB the right to make a back pay order as was found in the
National Labor Relations Act: ". . . to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
act." 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). However, other considerations
notwithstanding, -the Supreme Court has declared, in construing the previous act,
"'Back pay' is not a fine or penalty imposed upon the employer by the Board." Social
Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364 (1946). "The sanctions of the Act are
imposed not in punishment of the employer but for the protection of the employees."
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). The Board has consistently followed this position, employing the formula in its orders, "to make [the
employee] whole for any', loss of pay he may have suffered. . . ." Ohio Pub. Serv.
Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725, 742 (1943). The mere presence of other effects should not negate the proposition that the main purpose of such relief is a compensation to the
injured employees.
15. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1), (3) (1952).
16. See note 13 mipra.
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NLRB must already face. 17 Moreover, resolution of this difficulty will depend, in large measure, upon the success of the NLRB in resolving the
second of the problems-formulating definitions of a "reasonable" time
spent looking for substantially equivalent work and of other "suitable"
work to which the employee must turn. Although no exact definitions
governing all cases are possible, a number of factors can be isolated which
should be considered in specific cases.
What constitutes a "reasonable" length of time spent looking for
substantially equivalent employment should depend upon the intensity of
the search to find equivalent employment, the prospects which should be
known to the employee, and the education, experience and ability of the
employee which will not be fully utilized if he accepts less skilled employment.18 The trial examiner in the instant case found that seven months
would have been a reasonable time to spend searching for equivalent employment, 19 but had the employees eventually accepted other employment
rather than remaining idle, there is reason to believe that a longer period
might have been found reasonable under such circumstances. 2° What
constitutes other "suitable employment" should depend on the employee's
level of education, experience and ability, his former rate of pay and working conditions, and the availability of other employment. In applying the
relevant factors to both of these definitions, the Board should be mindful
that too stringent a mitigation requirement may serve to encourage employers' discriminatory discharges, a result dictating that doubtful cases
be resolved favorably to the employee.

Trade RegulationINJUNCTION DENIED UNDER FAIR-TRADE LAWS
AGAINST OUT-OF-STATE MAIL-ORDER HOUSE
SOLICITING SALES THROUGH PARENT CORPORATION
IN FAIR-TRADE JURISDICTION
Defendant District of Columbia mail-order house, a wholly owned subsidiary of a New York discount house, was formed after the parent was
17. The Board raised the problem of administrative difficulties in applying a mitigation standard in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941). The
Court held that principles of social desirability were of more importance than these
difficulties.
18. "There comes a time after opportunities for comparable jobs have been canvassed without success, when the job applicant must lower his sights or face a long
period of idleness." Instant case at 699. The court considered the time spent searching,
and the training, experience and background of the employees, as well as those classes
of jobs that might have been considered "satisfactory employment," a position essentially the same as that taken by the trial examiner in the case. Id. at 699-700.
19. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 787 (1956). See Supplemental
Intermediate Report, id. at 778.
20. In requiring that employees seek other "satisfactory employment," the court
seemed more concerned with the fact that the workers here had remained unemployed
for approximately two years rather than with the fact that they spent seven months
looking for "substantially equivalent" employment. Instant case at 700.
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enjoined under the New York fair-trade law' from violating plaintiff
manufacturer's resale price maintenance agreements. Customers seeking
purchase of plaintiff's products at discount from the parent's New York
retail store were provided with defendant's mail-order forms and instructed
2
to forward them to defendant in Washington, D. C., from whence delivery
was made. Moreover, the parent provided defendant material assistance
in conducting an advertising campaign in New York. The instant action
was brought under the New York fair-trade act 3 to enjoin defendant from
"wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling" 4 plaintiff's products within New York at less then the minimum prices stipulated
in plaintiff's applicable fair-trade agreements. The district court granted
an injunction, 5 but on appeal the court of appeals reversed and dismissed
the action (one judge dissenting), holding that by virtue of section 5 (a) (3)
of the McGuire Act 6 no fair-trade enforcement action lies unless the
resales in question occur in a fair-trade state, and that here the sales were
7
consummated in Washington, D. C., a free-trade jurisdiction. General

Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3114 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 224).
In the absence of congressional authorization, resale price maintenance
agreements applicable to goods moving in interstate commerce would be
violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Therefore, enforcement of such
agreements under state fair-trade laws may not transcend the scope of
9
Congress first granted resale price
the federal exemption afforded them.
from the antitrust laws by the
immunity
partial
agreements
maintenance
1. .N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369.
2. The District of Columbia and eight states presently have no operative fairtrade legislation. In these "free-trade" jurisdictions resale price maintenance agreements are unenforceable with respect to intrastate transactions as unlawful restraints
of trade. See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 113080, 3085 (10th ed. 1956). See also text at
note 7 infra.
3. Federal jurisdiction was obtained on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1952). Process was served in New York on defendant's treasurer who
also served as an officer of the New York parent, Masters, Inc. Defendant was held
to be "doing business" in New York. General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,
122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
4. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369 provides: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any
[lawful fair-trade] contract . . . whether the person so advertising, offering for sale
or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable
at the suit of any person damaged thereby."
5. General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 145 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
6. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1952).
7. Chief judge Clark based this aspect of his opinion on the theory that title to
the purchased goods passed in Washington; Judge Waterman, concurring in the judgment, indicated that the "situs" of the seller was controlling in determining the place
of sale. Judge Lombard dissented, adopting the view that the contract of sale was
formed in New York and that hence the resale occurred there.
8. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) ; Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
9. A state law authorizing enforcement of fair-trade agreements in a manner not
permitted by the federal enabling act would be invalid to that extent as conflicting
with an act of Congress under the supremacy clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Miller-Tydings Amendment.' 0 This amendment, however, was held not
to authorize enforcement of fair-trade agreements against non-signers
engaged in interstate commerce 11 nor against domestic retailers selling by
direct mail-order to out-of-state purchasers.' 2 In the McGuire Act, 13 enacted following these decisions, Congress provided that resale price maintenance agreements for products in free and open competition shall not
violate any antitrust act 14 nor constitute an unlawful burden on interstate
commerce 15 if such agreements are lawful with respect to intrastate
transacti6ns under the law of the jurisdiction "in which . . . resale is to
be made. ..

. ," 16

Similar exemption was extended to the enforcement

of a right of action authorized by state statute against "willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than
.

.

. prices prescribed in such contracts.

.

.

." whether or not the

defendant is a party to the contract.17 The act has been interpreted as
authorizing enforcement of resale price agreements in fair-trade states
against domestic mail-order vendors selling to out-of-state buyers.' 8 But
in Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. 19 in which defendantseller made sales by direct mail-order from the District of Columbia to
purchasers in Maryland, a fair-trade jurisdiction, 20 it was held that the
10. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
11. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
12. Sunbeam Corp. v. Wenling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 944 (1951), modified, 192 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951).
13. 66 STA. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
14. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1952) : "Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful any contracts or agreements
prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, or requiring a vendee to enter into contracts
or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, for the resale of a commodity
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name
of the producer or distributor or such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others,
when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to
which the commodity is to be transported for such resale."
15. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (4) (1952) : "Neither the making of contracts
or agreements as described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or
enforcement of any right or right of action as described in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall constitute an unawful burden or restraint upon, or interference with,
commerce."
16. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1952).
17. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1952) : "Nothing contained in this Act
or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement
of any right or right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or
hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling
any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a
party to such a contract or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable at the
suit of any person damaged thereby."
18. Sunbeam Corp. v. Macmillan, 110 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1953); Raxor Corp.
v. Goody, 121 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863 (1954).
19. 128 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1955).
20. MD. ANN. Cone art. 83, § 107 (1951), identical to the New York statute in
all respects material here.
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McGuire Act does not empower the states to prohibit delivery within their
borders of merchandise purchased in such manner, and that the law of
the place of sale should govern the enforceability of fair-trade agreements.

Defendant's activities in the fair-trade jurisdiction consisted solely of introducing advertising matter by mail and other media and the subsequent
delivery of goods ordered by direct mail communication. Deeming that
defendant's business was conducted "from Washington, D. C.," the court
held that the sales were concluded in that jurisdiction and therefore not
within the proscription of the laws of the fair-trade state. On the same
facts a second attack was made on defendant Masters Mail Order Co. in
Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. 21 in which it was
argued that advertising at cut-rate prices is a separate disruptive evil to
fair-trade price maintenance and constitutes a violation of the state fairtrade law. Rejecting this theory, the court held that the Maryland act's
prohibition of "advertising or offering for sale" 2 relates only to a sale
to be concluded within the jurisdiction and that the Revere case was controlling.2
In the instant case the same result was reached as in Revere
and Bissell although defendant not only advertised in the fair-trade jurisdiction, but also solicited orders there through the employees of its parent.
So long as the parties to a sales transaction are both within the same
fair-trade jurisdiction, no problem arises in determining where the "resale is . . . made" within the meaning of seftion 5 (a) (2) of the McGuire
Act. However, when the sale involves a free-trade state seller and a fairtrade state buyer, the method of determining where the sale is made becomes crucial. The act itself provides no clue 24 nor is the legislative
history of the bill of substantial aid. Some aspects of the history indicate
that Congress intended that fair-trade agreements may be enforced against
21. 140 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 240 F2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957).
22. MD. ANxV. CoD art. 83, § 107 (1951); see also McGuire Act, 66 STeAT. 632,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1952) set forth at note 17 supra.
23. Focusing on the publicity aspects of the defendant's business, the court said
that advertising alone constituted only a statement of fact indicating the advantages
and opportunities to be obtained in another jurisdiction, that the Maryland act did not
intend to so suppress freedom of expression, nor did the McGuire Act authorize such
action. In addition, when the retailer's only contact with the fair-trade state is through
mailed advertising and deliveries, as in the Revere and Bissell cases, corallary problems of enforcement are also presented. Mere advertising in a jurisdiction has been held
to be insufficient basis for service of process, Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 119 N.Y.S.2d 729, 733-34 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; McGriff v. Charles Antell, 256 P2d
703 (Utah 1953), and the courts of free trade jurisdictions possibly will refuse to
apply fair-trade laws of their sister states as against public policy of the forum of
enforcement although this aspect of "full faith and credit" has not yet been litigated
with regards to fair-trade legislation. See Cook, The Continuing Fair Trade Battle, 29
STe. JOHN's L. RPv. 66, 83 (1954). This issue was not present for determination in the
Revere and Bissell cases because defendant was incorporated in Maryland at the time
of commencement of these actions. This corporation was subsequently disbanded and
reincorporated in the District of Columbia. It should be noted that in view of the
multi-jurisdictional circulation enjoyed by major advertising media, a mail-order advertiser in the free-trade jurisdiction might inescapably find himself violating the law
of neighboring fair-trade states. See Note, 17 MD. L. Rzv. 148, 152 (1957).
24. See notes 14, 15 and 17 supra.
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out-of-state mail-order houses competing with local vendorsn2 thus suggesting a construction of "resale" broad enough to reach a transaction
even though only certain of its elements occur in the fair-trade jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the House rejected the Cole Amendment 2 6 which would
have made it an "act of unfair competition . . . to willfully and knowingly . . . deliver pursuant to a sale, or otherwise deliver . . . [a fair-

traded] commodity in any . . . State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, where such a contract or agreement is lawful, at less than the
price or prices so established in such contract or agreement." 27 The
members of the court in the instant case adopted three different methods
of determining the place of resale: where title passed,28 where the seller was
located,2 9 and where the contract was formed.30 No one of the three
seems to offer a completely satisfactory solution.
Acceptance of the title theory in effect is a determination that the
out-of-state vendor may not be enjoined from his activities, since the place
where title passes may be determined by the parties to the sale who will,
of course, select the place in which a less than fair-trade price sale is possible.31 Even if the intention of the parties does not appear and is not
implied from the fact that they wish to make a less than fair-trade price
sale, passage of title depends upon terms of the contract,32 for example,
payment of freight charges,'m variance of which bears no relation to the
ultimate fact giving rise to the controversy, namely, that an out-of-state
dealer is selling into a fair-trade state. The contract theory is open to
similar objections. Under this view the sale is effected at that place where
the contractual "offer" is "accepted." 3 4 Defendant's mail-order blank,
for example, stated that orders were to be accepted in the District of
25. See remarks of Senator Humphrey that the act will have the effect "that
where there are trade or branded names on which fair-trade prices have been established the mail-order-house will sell them at those prices in any state, just as the local
retail man is required to do." 98 CoNG. Rtc. 8887 (1952). See also instant case, 145 F.
Supp. 57, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
26. 98 CoNG. Ryc. 4954 (1952).
27. Id. at 4952. Although this amendment was opposed on its merits, see remarks
of Congressman Patman, 98 CoNG. Rrc. 4953 (1952), it was further opposed on the
ground that it created a federal cause of action. Id. at 4954.
28. See instant case, opinion of Chief Judge Clark, 244 F2d 681, 685 (2d Cir.
1957).

29. See instant case, opinion of judge Waterman, id. at 689-90.
30. See instant case, opinion of judge Lombard, id. at 691; district court opinion,

145 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
31. It should be noted that under such a theory the application of fair-trade legislation to domestic mail-order vendors selling to out-of-state buyers in free-trade jurisdictions would also no longer be possible. See instant case, 244 F2d 681, 690 (2d Cir.
1957).
32. Where the terms of the contract are "F.O.B. seller's place of business," title
generally passes at the seller's warehouse. UNIORM SALts AcT § 19, rule 5. Although
the seller's price indicated a single item and the order form indicated "No Charge For
Shipping," Chief judge Clark finds that the cost of shipping is invariably included
in a seller's price, thus "passed on to the . . .consumer," thus indicating the prepayment necessary for this conclusion; instant case, 244 F.2d 681, 685 (2d Cir. 1957).
33. WmrsToN, SALEs § 263 (rev. ed. 1948).
34. Ibid.
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Columbia. But the court may, as the dissent in the instant case did,
look through the statements of the parties to what it considers to be the
"realities" of the transaction and find that the mail-order seller's advertisements in fact constitute offers to be accepted by the buyer when he mails
in his order. Any application of the contract or title theories appears unrealistic in that those theories focus on legal fictions created to resolve
such questions as remedy and risk of loss rather than focusing directly
on resolution of the conflict between fair-trade and fair-trade policies
created by the mail-order transaction.
The location theory adopted by the concurring judge in the instant
case escapes this difficulty. It posits that the sale takes place where the
seller is located and determines where the seller is located by balancing his
activities in the free-trade state against his activities in the fair-trade state.
If a sufficient part of his activity is in the fair-trade state, then the sale
becomes subject to the jurisdiction of that state and may be enjoined. Aside
from the problem of determining how much activity will be necessary before
invoking the fair-trade state's jurisdiction, this approach also suffers from
requiring an all-or-nothing determination; once the seller's location is
fixed as being in the free-trade state no part of its activity in the fair-trade
state is subject to that state's control and vice versa.
It would seem that the word "resale" must be so construed as to be a
useful tool in resolving the conflict between free-trade and fair-trade policies
engendered by the mail order transaction. That Congress chose to
exempt enforcement of fair-trade agreements from the antitrust laws only
in those jurisdictions adopting fair-trade legislation demonstrates an intent
not to impose fair-trading upon those states not desiring it. In the case
of transactions, some aspects of which are in a fair-trade state and other
aspects of which are in a free-trade state, conflict between the two policies
is inevitable. To ban the transaction, thus effectuating the fair-trade
policy, is to affront the policy of the interested free-trade jurisdiction. And
yet to permit the transaction, of course, conflicts with the fair-trade
policy. There appears, however, to be a middle ground. Defendant's mail
order transaction in the instant case was a composite of advertising in New
York, solicitation of customers by the New York parent's employees, mailing of order forms to the District of Columbia by New York customers,
processing and filling of the orders in the District of Columbia by defendant, and delivery of the ordered merchandise to New York customers by
mail. That portion of the transaction most offensive to the New York fair
trade policy would seem to be the active solicitation of New York customers
by employees of defendant's New York parent. By conducting its mail
order business in this manner, defendant differs from New York retailers
only in that delivery is made from the District of Columbia by mail. It has
the benefit of display facilities and personal contact with potential customers to entice them to purchase. In order to balance fair-trade with
frce-trade interests, it would seem desirable to hold that this much of defendant's activity constituted a resale within the meaning of the McGuire
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Act and thus could be enjoined by New York while leaving the remainder
35
of defendant's mail order business free from restraint as in Revere and
3
Bissell -- defendant would be permitted to advertise both through the mails
and in other manner and would be permitted to fill orders solicited through
this means. Such a ruling would serve fair-trade policy to the extent that
it bars New York retailers from escaping the ban of New York law by
establishing what amounts to incorporated warehouses in a free-trade jurisdiction, and would at the same time serve free-trade policy by permitting
mail-order businesses established in free-trade jurisdictions to solicit business in fair-trade states through means typical of the mail-order business
rather than of local retailing.
35. 128 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1955).
36. 140 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957).

